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Abstract
In stark contrast to Natural Deduction for Intuitionistic Logic, Natural Deduction for Classical
Logic su6ers from some well-known limitations: although normalisation can be proved, the stan-
dard proof of Prawitz (Natural deduction. A proof — Theoretical study, Almquist and Wiksell,
Stockholm, 1965) is restricted to a fragment of classical predicate logic without ∨ and without
∃ due to some e6ects of the rule of classical negation, and a proof for classical predicate logic
without @ and without ⊥ cannot be given; the extension of Prawitz’ proof to a language with ∨
and ∃ due to Stalmarck (J. Symbolic Logic 56 (1991) 129) still remaining language dependent
on @ and ⊥.
Such facts raise some doubts about the proof theoretical signi?cance of the classical nega-
tion rule, the reductio ad absurdum, introduced by Prawitz. Instead of this rule, Peirce’s Rule
may be chosen, a purely implicative elimination rule, proposed for Classical Natural Deduction
by Curry (Foundations of Mathematical Logic, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963): this rule can
be proved to be deductively equivalent with the classical negation rule, and this rule admits
formulations of classical predicate logic without @ and without ⊥. In the following paper,
it is shown that with Peirce’s Rule, several theorems of weak normalisation for classical logic
are provable, i.e. weak normalisation for any fragment of classical logic containing → and
being enriched with any of the signs and respective rules ∧;∨;⊥;∀;∃—thus the most
general proofs of normalisation for classical predicate logic are given. c© 2002 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The famous and well-known proof of Weak Normalisation for Classical Predicate
Logic within Natural Deduction stated the ?rst time in 1965 in the fundamental book
of Prawitz ‘Natural Deduction’ [5] has at least two important limitations: at ?rst, this
proof was limited to the language →;∧;∀;⊥ with the related rules, i.e. despite the fact
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that this language is functionally complete it was not possible to extend the proof to
say a language →;∧;∨;∀;∃;⊥ with the respective rules, and signs like ∨ or ∃ have to
be introduced by de?nition. Secondly, the proof was not extendable as a normalisation
proof for classical logic to a reduced language, for example to the simple language →
and the related rules, due to the simple fact that the usual rules of natural deduction
for → give a picture only for constructive implication and not for classical implication.
These limitations would perhaps be of no interest if we were not used to expect
the listed abilities from proofs of theorems in the context of natural deduction. For
example, the proof of weak normalisation for intuitionistic predicate logic within natural
deduction can be extended to any of the languages and related rules →;∧;∀;⊥ or
→;∧;∨;∀;∃;⊥ or → or any other language containing → and the related rules and
what is perhaps more, proofs of normalisation for classical predicate logic within the
framework of sequent calculi do not lead to the restrictions listed above: they are not
language dependent in the described sense.
This situation has not changed signi?cantly with the appearence of the work of
Stalmarck in 1991 [6]: although Stalmarck was able to extend the proof of weak
normalisation for classical predicate logic to languages with ∨ and ∃ and their rules,
his proof remained language dependent at all, since his proof cannot be generalised to
cover languages missing ⊥, losing in this case the property of being classical.
What conclusions can be drawn from these considerations? One conclusion is that
natural deduction is not an appropriate tool for the proof theoretic analysis of classical
predicate logic, the reason probably lying in the fact that natural deduction is not
designed to capture the proof theoretical content of classical reasoning, while perfectly
mirroring the proof theoretical content of constructive reasoning, which is laid down
in the so-called BHK Interpretation of logic and is formalised best in the rules of
intuitionistic natural deduction.
However, instead of such a strange conclusion raising some doubt about the sig-
ni?cance of natural deduction for the proof theoretical analysis of classical predicate
logic, I would suggest another conclusion: perhaps the stated rules for classical predi-
cate logic within natural deduction are simply inadequate for a proof theoretic analy-
sis of classical predicate logic, especially the negation rule leading to classical logic,
the reductio ad absurdum. This conclusion seems reasonable in so far as it is pos-
sible to show a way out of the described unsatisfying situation simply by choos-
ing a new rule of natural deduction, Peirce’s Rule. This rule is a purely implicative
elimination rule emerging from the famous Law of Peirce, a purely implicative the-
orem, being provable only within classical logic. With Peirce’s Rule introduced for
the purposes of Natural Deduction by Curry [1], the mentioned defects of the known
proofs of normalisation for classical predicate logic can be avoided: now normalisa-
tion proofs for classical predicate language in every language containing → and being
enriched with any of the signs and respective rules ∧;∨;∀;∃;⊥ can be given, i.e.
we have two di6erent proofs, one for the language →;∧;∀;⊥ the other for the lan-
guage →;∧;∨;∀;∃;⊥; but these proofs remain valid for sublanguages like →;∧;∀ or
→;∧;∨;∀;∃, respectively, or other respective sublanguages containing →. The result-
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ing proofs are very general in the sense that they are not language dependent like the
traditional proofs.
2. Rules and calculi
2.1. Languages and formulas
The language L of predicate logic is to be de?ned as follows: a set V of countable
many individual variables: x; y; z; : : : ∈V ; a set K of countable many individual con-
stants: a; b; c; : : : ∈K ; a set P of predicates containing for every n∈N ∪ {0} a set Pn
of countable many n-ary predicates: Pn1 ; : : : ;P
n
k ; : : : for k ∈N; the set P0k for k ∈N is
the set of propositional variables. The set of terms is the set T=V ∪K : t ∈T , if t ∈V
or t ∈K ; from time to time we write terms as follows: r; s; t; : : : :
The logical vocabulary of the language L is the following: ⊥ is a 0-ary connective;
→;∧;∨ are 2-ary connectives; ∀;∃ are 1-ary quanti?ers; (; ), the parantheses, are aux-
iliar symbols.
The well-formed formulas of the language L are to be de?ned as follows. The
following expressions are exactly the well-formed formulas w6 of L :P jk (t1; : : : ; tj) is a
w6, if t1; : : : ; tj ∈T and P jk ∈P; ⊥ is a w6; (A→B); (A∧B); (A∨B) are w6, if A and
B are w6; ∀xA;∃xA are w6, if A is a w6. Parentheses, especially the outer ones, are
often missing. Negation is introduced by de?nition: ¬A↔df A→⊥.
The language L’ is the language L without ∨ and ∃—disjunction and existence are
introduced in L’ by de?nition A∨B↔df (A→B)→B, ∃xA↔df ∀y(∀x(A→A(x=y))→
A(x=y)).
It remains to de?ne a few concepts related to terms. X (s=t) has the meaning, that
in the expression X—term, formula or deduction—the term s has to be substituted at
all occurrences through the term t. A variable x is free in A, if x is not bound in A
by a quanti?er. A term t is free for x in A, if t is a constant, or if t is a variable and
is not going to be bound after substitution in A.
2.2. Deductions
For deductions we introduce the following notations:
D A D1 : : : Dk
A D A1 : : : Ak
A
The ?rst notation has the meaning, that formula A is a conclusion of deduction D;
the second, that formula A is an assumption of deduction D; the third, that due to
the application of a rule, formula A is a conclusion of the formulas A1; : : : ; Ak with
k ∈N, where the formulas A1; : : : ; Ak are conclusions of the deductions D1; : : : ;Dk ,
respectively.
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2.3. Rules
A Base rule: A deduction of A from the open assumption A.
[A]u [A→ B]u
D D′ D D
A A→ B B A
B
→ E
A→ B → Iu A → Ecu
D D D D′
A ∧ B A ∧ B A B
A
∧E
B
∧E
A ∧ B ∧I
[A]u [B]v
D D D D′ D′′
A B A ∨ B C C
A ∨ B ∨I A ∨ B ∨I C ∨Euv
[A→ ⊥]u
D D
⊥ ⊥
A
⊥R
A
⊥Rcu
D D
∀xA A
A(x=t)
∀E ∀xA ∀I
if t is free for x in A; if x is not free in an open assumption in D.
[A]u
D D′ D
A(x=t) ∃xA B
∃xA ∃I B ∃Eu
if t is free for x in A; if x is not free in B or in an open assumption in D except
[A].
2.4. Calculi
With the above listed rules, we de?ne three calculi of Natural Deduction for classical
predicate logic:
Prawitz’ calculus P in the language L’: all rules of →;∧;∀;⊥ without → Ec;
Curry’s calculus C in the language L: all rules without ⊥Rc;
Curry’s calculus C’ in the language L’: all rules of →;∧;∀;⊥ without ⊥Rc.
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2.5. Important concepts
For the de?nition of the most important concepts of natural deduction like ‘premise,
conclusion, minor premise, major premise, assumption, cut, cut formula, reduction se-
quence, normal derivation, irreducible derivation, normal form, to normalise, weak
normalisation property, maximal cut formula, cut rank, path, track, order, cut segment’
the reader is recommended to the book of van Dalen [2], especially Chapter 6 of this
book, with the deviation that van Dalen calls derivation what is here called deduction,
and hypothesis what is here called assumption.
Due to the availability of van Dalen’s book, a few important concepts should be
repeated: a path in a deduction is a sequence of occurrences of formulas A1; : : : ; An,
such that A1 is an assumption, An is the conclusion and Ai is a premise immediately
above Ai+1, where 16i6n− 1. A track is an initial part of a path, which stops at the
?rst minor premise or at the conclusion; in the presence of rules for ∨ and ∃, a track
leads as usual from the major premise through the cancelled assumptions downwards to
the conclusion. A cut is a formula occurrence in a deduction, which is the conclusion
of an introduction rule and the major premise of an elimination rule. A cut segment
is a sequence of occurrences of one formula in a track, where the ?rst occurrence is a
result of an introduction rule, and the last is eliminated by an elimination rule; it has
to be remarked that in the presence of Peirce’s Rule→Ec, a new sort of cut segments
can occur, generated through an application of this rule→Ec, whereas the usual cut
segments are generated through applications of rules ∨E and ∃E. Further on, a new
de?nition has to be given, which plays an essential role in later proofs, the de?nition of
a trace. A trace is a part of a track, where the ?rst formula occurrence is a conclusion
of an application of Peirce’s Rule→Ec, and every formula occurrence is a conclusion
of an arbitrary elimination rule.
3. Examples
De?nability of ∨ in a → language and calculus
[A]u
D
C [C → B]v
D′ B → E
(A→ B)→ B A→ B → Iu
[B]
→ E
D′′
C
C
→ Ecv
D
B
(A→ B)→ B → I
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D
A [A→ B]u
B
→ E
(A→ B)→ B → Iu
De?nability of ∃ in a →;∀ language and calculus
D [∀x(A→ A(x=y))]u
A(x=t) (A→ A(x=y))(x=t) ∀E
A(x=y)
→ E
∀x(A→ A(x=y))→ A(x=y) → Iu
∀y(∀x(A→ A(x=y))→ A(x=y)) ∀I
if t is free for x in A.
[A]u
D′
B [B→ A(x=z)]v
D A(x=z)
→ E
∀y(∀x(A→ A(x=y))→ A(x=y)) A→ A(x=z) → Iu
∀x(A→ A(x=z))→ A(x=z) ∀E ∀x(A→ A(x=z)) ∀I
[A](x=z)
→ E
D′(x=z)
B
B
→ Ecv
if x is not free in B or in an open assumption in D′ except [A].
4. Conversions, contractions and so on
4.1. Conversions
The well-known conversions eliminate the cuts, for example in the case of impli-
cations—for the others see [5]:
[A]u D
D′ [A]
D B D′
A A→ B → Iu converts to B
B
→ E
4.2. Falsum contractions
The well known falsum contractions reduce conclusions of ⊥R to atoms,
for example in the case of implications—again Prawitz [5] shows the
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others:
D D
⊥ ⊥
A→ B ⊥R moves to B ⊥R
A→ B → I
4.3. Total implication contractions
[A→ B]u [A]v
[B→ C]w B → E
[(A→ B)→ C]u C → E
D moves to [(A→ B)→ C] → Iu
A→ B D
A→ B → Ecu A→ B [A]v
B
→ E
B
→ Ecw
A→ B → Iv
[A ∧ B]u [A ∧ B]v
[A→ C]w A ∧E [B→ C]n B ∧E
[(A ∧ B)→ C]u C → E C → E
D moves to [(A ∧ B)→ C] → Iu [(A ∧ B)→ C] → Iv
A ∧ B D D
A ∧ B → Ecu A ∧ B A ∧ B
A
∧E
B
∧E
A
→ Ecw B → Ecn
A ∧ B ∧I
[∀xA]u
[A(x=y)→ C]v A(x=y) ∀E
[∀xA→ C]u C → E
D moves to [∀xA→ C] → Iu
∀xA D
∀xA → Ecu ∀xA
A(x=y)
∀E
A(x=y)
→ Ecv
∀xA ∀I
4.4. Partial implication contractions
D′
[A→ B]u A
[B→ C]w B → E
[(A→ B)→ C]u C → E
D moves to [(A→ B)→ C] → Iu
D′ A→ B D D′
A A→ B → Ecu A→ B A
B
→ E
B
→ E
B
→ Ecw
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[A∧B]u
[A→C]w A ∧E
[(A∧B)→C]u C →E
D moves to [(A∧B)→C] → Iu
A∧B D
A∧B →Ecu A∧B
A
∧E
A
∧E
A
→Ecw
A similar partial implication contraction with ∧ holds for B.
[∀xA]u
[A(x=t)→C]v A(x=t) ∀E
[∀xA→C]u C →E
D moves to [∀xA→C] → Iu
∀xA D
∀xA →Ecu ∀xA
A(x=t)
∀E
A(x=t)
∀E
A(x=t)
→Ecv
[(A ∨ B)→C]u
D [A]v [B]w
A ∨ B D′ D′′
A ∨ B →Ecu F F
F
∨Evw
moves to
[A]u [B]v
D′ D′′
[F→C]w F [F→C]w F
[A ∨ B]m C →E C →E
C
∨Euv
[(A ∨ B)→C] → Im [A]n [B]o
D D′ D′′
A ∨ B F F
F
∨Eno
F
→Ecw
[∃xA→C]u
D [A]v
∃xA D′
∃xA →Ecu B
B
∃Ev
moves to
[A]u
D′
[B→C]v B
[∃xA]w C →E
C
∃Eu
[∃xA→C] → Iw [A]m
D D′
∃xA B
B
∃Em
B
→Ecv
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Implication contractions remove applications of →Ec: in cases where the conclu-
sions of these applications have the shape →;∧;∀ without any condition, in cases
where the conclusions of these applications have the shape →;∧;∨;∀;∃ under the
condition, that the application of →Ec is followed by a certain elimination rule. Im-
plication contractions without a condition are so to speak total or context independent,
implication contractions with a condition partial or context dependent. The total im-
plication contractions remove an application of →Ec and simultaneously generate an
application of →Ec with a conclusion of lower rank. Partial implication contractions
remove an application of →Ec and simultaneously generate an application of →Ec
followed immediately by a lower number of elimination rules than in the removed
case, i.e. followed immediately by a shorter trace. The total implication contractions
atomize Peirce’s rule, partial implication contractions move all the elimination rules of
a track in a position before Peirce’s rule.
As a nice byproduct, the total as well as the partial implication contractions remove
the cut segments generated through applications of Peirce’s rule: the condition of the
partial implication contractions is of no signi?cance in this respect, because a cut
segment is given only if a certain elimination rule follows Peirce’s rule—but just then
partial implication contractions will be applied.
4.5. Permutations
With the well-known permutations and existence permutations, a formula being a
premise in an application of an arbitrary elimination rule ·E and the conclusion of ∨E
or ∃E is moved upwards.
D D′ D′′
A ∨ B C C
C D′′′ ∨E
F
·E
permutes to
D′ D′′
D C D′′′ C D′′′
A ∨ B F ·E F ·E
F
∨E
D D′
∃xA C
C D′′ ∃E
F
·E
permutes to
D′
D C D′′
∃xA F ·E
F
∃E
4.6. Empty conversions
The empty conversions are given in the cases, where rules →Ec or ∨E or ∃E are
applied without cancelling assumptions. Due to the triviality of these conversions, they
are not mentioned in the following proofs.
D
C
C
→Ec converts to
D
C
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[B]u
D D′ D′′
A ∨ B C C
C
∨Eu
converts to
D′
C
A similar empty conversion holds if D′′ has no cancelled assumption [B], but D′
has a cancelled assumption [A].
D D′
∃xA C
C
∃E converts to
D′
C
5. Theorems
Equivalence theorem. The calculi P and C’ are deductively equivalent, i.e. there is a
deduction of A from the set of assumptions Q in P; if and only if there is a deduction
of A from the set of assumptions Q in C’.
Proof. We have to prove only that →Ec is deducible in P and ⊥Rc in C’, what is
essentially contained in [1, p. 282].
[A→B]u [A→⊥]v [A]w
D ⊥ →E
A B
⊥R
(A→B)→A → Iu A→B → Iw
[A→⊥]v A →E
⊥ →E
A
⊥Rcv
[A→⊥]u
D
⊥
A
⊥R
A
→Ecu
Weak normalisation theorem of C’ in L’. All deductions of the calculus C’ in the
language L’ can be normalised.
Before we are able to prove this theorem, we have to prove 4 Lemmata.
Lemma 1. The conclusions of the rule ⊥R can be reduced to atomic conclusions.
Proof. This is the consequence of the well known falsum contractions and the proof
proceeds through a sequence of applications of falsum contractions, since with a single
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falsum contraction, the rank of the conclusion of an application of the rule ⊥R is
lowered down by 1. To be precise, the proof is by induction over the rank of the
formulae being the conclusion of the rule ⊥R, where with respect to every shape of
this formulae a reduction lowering its rank is given.
Lemma 2. The conclusions of the rule →Ec can be reduced within the calculus C’
and the language L’ to atomic conclusions.
Proof. The proof of this lemma proceeds through a sequence of applications of the total
implication contractions. These total implication contractions remove an application of
a rule →Ec with a conclusion having rank k, but produce in the same step a cut and
an application of a rule →Ec with a conclusion having rank k−1. So, it is assured that
through successive applications of total implication contractions, ?nally, the conclusions
of all applications of the rule →Ec are atomic.
Again, this proof proceeds essentially by induction over the rank of the formulae
being the conclusion of the rule →Ec, where with respect to every shape of this
formula in the language L’ a contraction lowering its rank is given.
The nice byproduct of the total implication contractions is that all cut segments
generated through applications of →Ec disappear ?nally.
Lemma 3. Given a deduction D in calculus C’ and language L’ with a cut at the
bottom having rank n while all other cuts have rank ¡n; the conversion of D at this
lowest cut yields a deduction with cuts only of rank ¡n.
Proof. For the proof of this well-known lemma in natural deduction see for example
[2, p. 198, Lemma 6:2:5]. It can be remarked that although Peirce’s Rule is present, the
meaning of this lemma has not changed at all, since with Lemma 2 it is assured that
all cut segments in the context of applications of Peirce’s Rule are dissolved; the only
thing remaining to do is the elimination of the cuts, which is perfectly done within the
usual conversions and van Dalen’s lemma 6:2:5.
Lemma 4. Given a reducible deduction D within calculus C’ and language L’; there
is a deduction D′ such that we can reduce D in one step to D′ with the cut rank of
D′ being truly smaller than the cut rank of D.
Proof. Given a reducible deduction D, a conversion is applied to a maximal cut having
only cuts with lower rank above. The result is by Lemma 3 a new deduction D′ with
either a new maximal cut of lower rank than in D or with a smaller number of maximal
cuts than D.
Now, we are in a situation to prove the theorem on weak normalisation. We assume
an arbitrary deduction to be given in the calculus C’ in the language L’: with Lemma 1,
we know that we can restrict the applications of the rule ⊥R to atoms and with
Lemma 2, we know that we are able to restrict the applications of the rule →Ec to
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atoms, the latter having the e6ect that the cut segments in the context of applications
of rules →Ec are disappearing totally. Finally, Lemma 4 assures that all cuts in our
deductions can be converted in a ?nite number of steps.
A nice corollary to this weak normalisation theorem of C’ in L’ is weak normalisation
of every classical logic in any language L” being a sublanguage of L’ and containing
implication. For example, the described weak normalisation theorem holds even for
the positive fragment of classical predicate logic in the language →;∧;∀—a language
independent result we are not able to achieve with the traditional rules of normal
deduction, where the classial negation rule reductio ad absurdum is assumed instead
of Peirce’s Rule.
Corollary on normal form of C’ in L’. In a normal deduction, a track has the follow-
ing form: at 8rst we have elimination rules with the exception of Peirce’s rule, then
the ex-falso-rule, then Peirce’s rule, and 8nally the introduction rules. Each part of
these four parts of a track may be empty.
The reason for this canonical form of a track within C’ in L’ is simple: without
Peirce’s rule, C’ is identical with the intuitionistic calculus and therefore we have the
canonical order of elimination rules except Peirce’s rule, ex-falso- and introduction
rules in a track. For the application of Peirce’s rule only on atoms, it can be applied
only after the ex-falso-rule.
Weak normalisation theorem of C in L. All deductions of the calculus C in the
language L can be normalised.
Before we are able to prove this theorem, we have to prove 3 Lemmata.
Lemma 5. The traces of applications of the rule →Ec can be reduced within the
calculus C and the language L down to 0.
Proof. The proof of this lemma proceeds through a sequence of applications of the
partial implication contractions. These partial implication contractions remove an appli-
cation of a rule →Ec in the cases, where this application of the rule →Ec is followed
immediately by another arbitrary elimination rule, but they produce a new application
of the rule →Ec in the same step. Considering the trace of an application of →Ec
with length k, one has to remark that after a partial implication contraction of that
application, the trace of the new, generated application of the rule →Ec has length
k − 1. So, through successive applications of partial implication contractions, every
trace of any application of the rule →Ec disappears.
In cases where the cut formula of a cut segment in the context of an application
of Peirce’s Rule is ?rst of all the minor premise of an application of ∨E or ∃E and
then the major premise of an arbitrary elimination rule, one has to apply at ?rst an
appropriate permutation and then the respective partial implication reduction.
Again, this proof proceeds essentially by induction over the rank of the formulae
being the conclusion of the rule →Ec, where with respect to every shape of this formula
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in the language L, a partial implication contraction lowering the trace of applications
of the rule →Ec is given.
Again, the nice byproduct of the partial implication contractions is that all cut seg-
ments generated through applications of →Ec disappear ?nally.
Lemma 6. Given a deduction D in calculus C and language L with a cut segment at
the bottom having rank n while all other cut segments have rank ¡n; a number of
permutations and the conversion of D at this lowest cut yields a deduction with cut
segments only of rank ¡n.
Proof. The proof of this well-known lemma can be found once more in [2, p. 207,
Lemma 6:3:4]. It does not matter that the mentioned lemma of van Dalen’s book is
proved with respect to intuitionistic logic, since the possibly disturbing e6ects of the
rule →Ec are turned o6: Lemma 5 guarantees that all cut segments generated through
applications of →Ec are eliminated; the only thing remaining to do is the elimination
of simple cuts and cut segments in the context of ∨E and ∃E, the work of van Dalen’s
lemma 6:3:4.
Lemma 7. Given a reducible deduction D within calculus C and language L; there is
a deduction D′ such that D can be reduced in one step to D′ with the cut rank D′
being truly smaller than the cut rank of D.
Proof. Given a reducible deduction D, a conversion or a number of permutations with
a conversion is applied to a maximal cut segment having only cut segments with
lower rank above. The result is, by Lemma 6, a new deduction D′ with either a new
maximal cut segment of lower rank than in D or with a smaller number of maximal
cut segments than D.
Now, the theorem on weak normalisation can be proved. Let us assume an arbitrary
deduction to be given in the calculus C in the language L: with Lemma 1 we know
that we can restrict the applications of the rule ⊥R to atoms and with Lemma 5 we
know that the applications of the rule →Ec may be modi?ed such that no elimination
rule follows an application of a rule →Ec in a track, the latter having the e6ect that
the cut segments in the context of applications of rules →Ec are disappearing totally.
Finally, Lemma 7 assures that all simple cuts and all cut segments in the context of
∨E and ∃E can be converted in a ?nite number of steps.
Again, we get as a nice corollary to this theorem weak normalisation for any classical
fragment of C in a language L” being a sublanguage of L and containing implication.
For example, the described proof holds even in the case of the negationless and fal-
sumless language →;∧;∨;∀;∃.
Corollary on normal form of C in L. At once we have the following canonical form of
a track in a normal deduction: at 8rst elimination rules with the exception of Peirce’s
rule are applied, then the ex-falso-rule, and 8nally introduction rules—Peirce’s rule
is applied on all sorts of formulas, not only on atomic ones, if these formulas are
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not eliminated in the next rule application of the track; i.e. the premise of Peirce’s
Rule, which is the conclusion of Peirce’s Rule, may be a compound formula, but it
is assured by the partial implication contractions that it will not be eliminated in
the next rule application of the track by an elimination rule, and therefore, Peirce’s
rule is applied in between the ex-falso-rule and the introduction rules of a track.
Obviously, any part of a track may be empty.
Remark. With the exception of a paper of Gordeev [4] and the mentioned Curry [1]
no other work dealing with Peirce’s Rule is known to the author. Gordeev’s paper
investigates primitive recursive estimations of cut elimination procedures within the
intuitionistic sequent calculus enriched with Peirce’s Rule. Curry’s proof of cut elimi-
nation is related to sequent calculi as well.
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